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 DECLINING „COMMON” AGRICULTURAL POLICY? 
 






This paper focuses on the basic element of the 2003 CAP reform process: on the single farm 
payment and its national implementation models. . We examine possible economic impacts 
(production distorting effects, redistribution, restructuring, resource allocation and effects on land 
market) of the basic SFP models. In sum, we can say that the 2003 CAP reform and the new support 
provide an opportunity to overcome some of the difficulties the CAP faces with. However, the wide 
range of national diversities threatens the principle of the single market, and transparency and 
operation of the common market organizations. As there is a wide range of possible constructions 
member states can decide for, the common nature of the CAP gets more and more questionable. 
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Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) of the European Union (EU) has been a very important 
building block of the European integration. However, after a spectacular development it has become a 
neuralgic are of the integration. In order to overcome the difficulties a significant reform process 
began in 1992. Despite of the significant changes, however, the pressure on the system of the CAP has 
not stopped. With the 2003 reform decisions we have arrived to the third phase of the reform process, 
and this phase provides an opportunity to overcome some of the difficulties. (However, there remains 
a lot to be done.) 
Measures agreed by the Council in June 2003, envisage a basic reform of the Common 
Agricultural Policy (CAP) through which the European Union (EU) made a significant step in the 
direction of a more transparent and less trade distorting agricultural policy. Our paper focuses on the 
basic element of the reform process: on the single farm payment and its national implementation 
models.  The 2003 CAP reforms have provided a large space for national manoeuvre. The following 
elements of the reform fall within national competence: possibility of partial decoupling; 
determination of the date of introduction (2005-2007); limited freedom to select the single farm 
payment (SFP) calculation model (historic, regional or hybrid); re-allocation a part of the support 
through the national envelope.  
Therefore, instead of a simplification of the support system, different de-coupling models, and the 
possibility of partial de-coupling have resulted in a very complex system with a wide range of national 
diversities. It is interesting then to examine the economic impacts of the new direct income support 
system. The second part of our paper overviews the most important features of the new support system 
and outlines the basic models of calculating the single farm payment. Possible economic impacts 
(production distorting effects, redistribution, restructuring, resource allocation and effects on land 
market) of the basic SFP models are discussed in part three. Part four summarizes the main effects of 
the 2003 CAP reform. 
 
 
  22 Basic models of calculating the single farm payment 
 
The most radical feature of the June 2003 CAP reform agreement is the decoupling of subsidies 
from production and their replacement by one farm payment, known as the Single Farm Payment 
(SFP). The new payments are based on reference data, and because of the already compulsory cross-
compliance, they are available only on condition that certain environmental, animal welfare food 
security and quality standards are met. Through the instrument of modulation member countries can 
reduce the SFP for bigger farms up to 5 percent in order to finance additional rural development 
measures. If the CAP budget threatens to exceed the budget ceilings agreed in October 2002, a new 
financial discipline can be invoked to scale down payments. 
Decoupling has been made less strict than the European Commission originally proposed. 
Member states can choose for a delay of its introduction until 2007 instead of 2005. More important, 
member states are enabled to limit decoupling of income payments for a number of products, as they 
have the possibility to maintain a proportion of coupled policies (See Table 1).  
 
Table 1: Maximum rate of coupled support, selected products 
 
Supported product  Maximum rate of coupled support (%) 
Cereals and oilseeds  25 
Rice  42 
Protein crops (supplementary)  100 




             Slaughter Premium 
             Suckler Cow Premium 
Option 2 
             Slaughter Premium 
Option 3 











As a new element the 2003 CAP reforms have provided a large space for national manoeuvre. 
The following elements of the reform fall within national competence: 
–  possibility of partial decoupling; 
–  determination of the date of introduction (2005-2007); 
–  re-allocation a part of the support through the national envelope; 
–  limited freedom to select the single farm payment (SFP) calculation model (historic, 
regional or hybrid). 
As regards the SFP model there are two basic approaches. The historic model creates entitlements 
to support based on the average level of subsidies claimed in the livestock and arable sectors during 
the 2000-2002 reference period. The number of entitlements allocated to each farmer is set equal to the 
average area of land giving rise to subsidy plus all pasture land during that same period. The value of 
each of these entitlements is established by dividing the average amount of subsidy claimed by the 
farmer by the number of entitlements awarded. 
The regional (area based) model operates by basing entitlements to farmers on the area of 
eligible land that they declare in their 2005 Integrated Administration and Control Scheme (IACS) 
returns. The value of all entitlements within a region would be set at a single, common rate. However, 
it is possible to create a third approach to decoupling by combining the historic and regional 
approaches into what is termed a hybrid model. This can be done in different ways to create various 
  3forms of hybrid. However, there are two broad hybrid classes – horizontal and vertical. A horizontal 
hybrid is created by putting a set proportion of the decoupled budget arising from each coupled regime 
into a regional element, with the balance of the budget allocated according to historical claims 
patterns. A vertical hybrid is created by putting specific coupled schemes, or proportions thereof, into 
the area-based component, with the balance allocated according to historical claims patterns. Also the 
ratio of regional and historical elements of hybrid models can vary in later years. If the ratios do not 
change in the future the model is static, while if the model incorporates changing ratios the model is 
dynamic.  Models chosen by member states are summarized in Table 2. 
 
Table 2: National implementation models 
 




Maximum possible coupling  F      
Partial decoupling  A, B, GR, I, NL, P, 
E, GB (Scotland) 
M, SLO  DK, S  SF, D 
“Full” decoupling  IRL, GB (Wales)    L, GB 
(NIRL) 
GB (England) 
Source: Halmai, 2004 
 
As Table 2 shows SFP is applied not only in the 15 “old” member states but also in two new 
member states, and there are four different models in the United Kingdom (England, Scotland, Wales 
and Northern Ireland). There is also a small difference between the implementation models of 
Flandreau and Vilonia in Belgium. As you can see the chosen constructions are very different. Full 
decoupling is only applied in a part of the United Kingdom, in Northern Ireland and in Luxemburg.  
 
 
3 Certain economic impacts of the basic SFP models 
 
3.1 Production distortions 
 
Economic impact of the various decoupling models depends mainly on the level the decoupled 
payment effects production decisions. The 2003 CAP reform constitutes a major change in the way 
direct payments are made in the EU. The introduction of the SFP results in a reduction in the link 
between the payments and production. Findings of the OECD PEM analysis (2003a) show that 
payments based on acreage are the most decoupled category. In that way they have no or at most 
minimal trade and production distorting effects. Furthermore, the impact of such payments is all the 
lower where there is no obligation to grow specific crops on eligible land in order to receive the 
support. SFP meets both criteria, however, the regional system meets better the criteria than the 
historical system based on former subsidy types (and on their distortions). Modelling the producers’ 
production decisions also the results of the OECD’s AGLINK model show that the SFP’s influence is 
minimal (OECD, 2004). 
As OECD (2002) suggests policy reform should be eased by evidence of a win-win relationship 
between the income transfer efficiency of domestic policies and their tendency to distort trade. 
According to this work there is a strong inverse correlation between the extent to which a measure 
distorts production and trade, and its efficiency in transferring income benefits to those who farm. Put 
simply, the more a policy pays to a farmer without affecting production decisions, the greater the share 
of income retained by the household and the smaller the impact on production and trade. Both the 
results of the PEM analysis (OECD, 2005) and analysis on transfer efficiency (OECD, 2002) suggest 
that the SFP seems to be an efficient choice. It is efficient as it provides only minimal distortions and 
can meet the simultaneous requirement of income support of domestic producers and minimal 
distortions with the smallest cost. SFP meets all of the above mentioned criteria, however, the regional 
system meets them better than the historical system based on former subsidy types (and on their 
distortions). 
  43.2 Redistribution effects 
 
A change in a support model is inevitably accompanied by redistribution effects: there will be 
winners and losers of the new system. In case of the historical model redistribution effect may occur in 
the beef sector. Significant part of the special beef and extensification premium got back from the 
fattener to the veal keeper in the old (coupled) system. Decoupling breaks down this transfer 
mechanism. In case of the historical model fatteners may realize an unexpected benefit, while veal 
breeders will suffer a loss. Transfer of resources comes about inside the sector.  
In the regional system transfer of resources between sectors is also possible. This system favours 
the more extensive farms with a net transfer from intensive farms. (For details see DEFRA, 2003a.) 
The regional system has more beneficiaries and provides opportunity to redistribute the resources 
between regions and sectors.  
Producers get different amount of support per hectare in the historical model, even in the case of 
neighbouring farms. (Unit value of the support entitlement is different from farm to farm.) However, 
producers’ commitments, the need to meet the criteria of cross compliance, are the same for all of 
them. Different level of support in exchange for the same standards could be a source of future 
conflicts.  The regional system (based on average areas) seems to be more rational from this point of 
view. However, the level of area based subsidy in a region has been calculated on the basis of the 
former level of coupled payments and not on the basis of private costs of cross compliance and of 
providing public goods.  
 
Table 3: Effects of decoupling models 
 




May have effect  More limited 
effects 
Limited effects 
Ratio of different components can 
influence 
Redistribution  Limited resource 
transfer inside a 






for the reduction 
of difference in 
support levels 
If the ratio of the 
regional 
component is 
high, it is similar 




tone the effects 
    Supports  transition  (transitional 
hybrid) 
Dispersion of the 
value of support 
entitlements 
High, different 
levels per farm 
No (single value 
per farm in the 
region) 
Reduces dispersion (negative 
correlation with the ratio of regional 
component) 
Winners and 




(except for beef) 
Favours the more 
extensive farms 
Similar to the 
regional, but the 
effects are not so 
significant and 
can be influenced 
Similar to the 
horizontal, but 
there are more 
opportunity to 
tone the effects 
Possible shock 
(due to the 
change in the 
support system) 




Milder than in case of a regional 
system 
Source: Halmai, 2004 
  5Distortions of the basic models can be reduced by a hybrid model. As regards its impacts, the 
horizontal hybrid model stands between the two basic models. Model results (DEFRA, 2003a) show 
that: the larger is the ratio of the regional component, the larger is the redistribution effect relative to 
the historical model.  
Vertical hybrids also provide an opportunity to fine tone the basic models. (E.g.: it gives more 
rational results for the beef sector relative to the historical model. See: DEFRA, 2003b.) However, 
targeting of decoupled subsidies seems to be a paradox. It can be applied only on the short term in 
order to prevent shocks arising after the change of the support system. On the mid- and longer term 
market actors adjust to the changes, they can alter their production practice or they can enter other 
sectors. Therefore, targeted hybrids can be applied only in support of transition. (The main effects are 
summarized in Table 3.) 
 
 
3.3 Restructuring and resource allocation 
 
A fully decoupled support does not influence the producers’ production decisions. Structure of 
production depends exclusively on the relative profitability of different products. Production should 
cover at least the variable costs.  
In these circumstances restructuring may accelerate. Unprofitable units may abandon production 
as they will get the single farm payment even without production. Competitive units however, may 
acquire resources of the former actors (land, animals, farm buildings etc.). A system which is fixed for 
several years in advance improves the anticipation of market actors and creates better investment 
environment. Consequently resource allocation could be more effective.  
However, full decoupling may have strong negative effects in certain (mainly marginal or socio-
economically sensitive) areas. France was the most important antagonist of full decoupling, but also 
Great Britain (one of the most important supporters of radical reforms) stressed that full decoupling 
may result in depopulation of rural areas or in a transition to a ranch-type farming in certain areas. 
Undesirable social consequences may arise (Agra Europe, 19
th September 2003). 
In fact, the new system may be accompanied by a strong reduction of expenditures and more 
extensive structures can be expected. Marginal areas could be compensated through the second pillar 
of the CAP (rural development measures). (Wide ranging instruments comprise adjustment related 
investment subsidies, agri-environment and forestry programs etc.) 
An important element of the implementation is the possibility of partial decoupling in case of 
certain subsidies. As you can see in Part 2 member states have opted for different options ranging from 
full decoupling to the maximum possible level of coupling (see Table 2). Most of the member states 
retained some coupled support. However, disadvantages of partial decoupling are very important: it 
continues to prevent production adjusting to market signals and it raises production above the optimal 
level distorting agricultural markets and at the same time, slows structural change down.   
Through partial decoupling member states want to avoid sudden changes in production. 
Therefore, allocation efficiency improves only to a limited extent on the short term. On the medium 
term degree of decoupling and efficiency of allocation can increase.  
It was expected that single farm payment brings a significant simplification of the support system. 
However, different de-coupling models, and the possibility of partial de-coupling have resulted in a 
very complex system with a wide range of national diversities. Severe problems may arise during the 
implementation and control of the system. The wide range of national diversities threatens the 
principle of the single market, and transparency and operation of the common market organizations.  
 
 
  63.3 Possible effects on land and lease markets 
 
Single farm payment is based on agricultural area. As its amount is significantly higher than that 
of the former area based payments, it can theoretically raise the price and rental cost of land.  
The system favours mainly the landowners. When landowners cultivate themselves their land it is 
really the producer who realizes the support. However, if a prospective farmer purchases the land he 
has to pay not only for the market value of the land, but also the net present value of the future 
transfers. What is more, when the land is rented then the tenant conveys much of the support to the 
landowner.  
The above described effects may be different depending upon the selected model of decoupling. 
The traditional model may strengthen the position of tenants, as the amount of support entitlements is 
based on past agricultural performance (land cultivated, number of animals etc.). After the contracted 
period the tenant may activate its support entitlement on other areas, while the landowner is compelled 
to let the land by lease without support entitlement. In this case the rise in land prices is limited, what 
is more land prices may even reduce.  
In the regionalized system the number of entitlements is based on the total area of arable and 
grass land reported in the year of introduction. All the farmers (including also the tenants) working on 
these areas can (and certainly will) apply for the single farm payment. The amount of the support will 
then capitalize mainly in land prices and rent fees. This is inconsistent with a basic principle of the 
reform, with the aim of strengthening the position of producers (instead of landowners). This principle 
is especially important for the new member states (with often highly complicated landownership 
system), which however, are compelled to apply this regionalized system. 




4 Possible impacts of the 2003 CAP reform. (Summing up remarks) 
 
Similarly to the earlier reform steps the decisions of the 2003 CAP reform were significantly less 
radical than the Commission originally proposed. As regards the construction of the reform the 
following compromises should be stressed. 
 
−  Partial decoupling. Full decoupling of direct payments from production was the 
central element of the Commission’s January 2003 proposal. The approved decisions 
however, foresee only partial decoupling.  
−  Modulation. In contrast to the originally proposed digressive reduction a linear system 
was approved which provides opportunity only for a limited reallocation of funds. 
Reallocation of the modulated support is based on rather complex rules.  
−  Cross-compliance. The range of standards which should be met in order to be eligible 
for the single farm payment is narrower than the Commission proposed. However, 
problems may arise during the control even of this limited range of standards. The fact 
that – due to the special structure of the support system – meeting the same standards 
makes producers eligible for different sum of support can be a source of allocation 
problem.  
−  National divergences. The system based on partial decoupling will be very 
complicated. Significantly different models will be implemented. Implementation and 
control of all the systems both can cause significant difficulties. Wide ranging national 
divergences threaten the principle of single market and therefore transparency and 
operation of the common market organizations.  
  7−  Financial disciplines. The automatism designed to prevent the overspending is more 
rigorous than the former stabilization systems. When it comes into operation single 
farm payment can be curtailed significantly. This mechanism brings uncertainty into 
the economic environment of farming. In contrast to the originally proposed 
digressive system of dynamic modulation the reduction of the support is linear, so it 
creates proportional burden for producers with different farm sizes.  
 
Despite of the above mentioned compromises implementation of the 2003 CAP reform may bring 
significant changes to the operational environment of the CAP.  
 
Market coordination becomes more important and the competitive pressure increases. Reform 
decisions will significantly alter the CAP’s operation mechanism. Decisive part of direct payments 
will be decoupled. Payments will not influence farmers’ production decisions. As a main rule, the 
single farm payment does not have effect on production structure. Competition between different 
market actors may become more intensive, and so do the pressure for return. However, the possibility 
of partial decoupling may mitigate these effects as it limits the adjustment to market signals. 
Production in that way may continue to exceed the market demand.  
Reduction of overproduction and increasing competitiveness can be expected. The reform will be 
accompanied with significant market effects, particularly in the dairy and beef sectors. (These effects 
however, differ significantly under the different national implementation alternatives.)  Because of 
reduction in milk and dairy prices, declining surplus and the increase of competitiveness can be 
expected. Overproduction in the beef sector decreases significantly, prices will increase after an initial 
downturn and profitability improves. This process will supported by the fact that import protection 
continues to be high. Due to the rise in efficiency competitiveness improves not only the domestic 
markets. After a possible reform in the sugar sector, surpluses can further reduce. Dynamism of 
agricultural markets can be even stronger for the EU-25. New member states gradually exploit their 
possibilities. Market of the EU-25 will be characterized by improving competitiveness and stronger 
pressure for efficiency.  
There will be important redistribution effects. An important objective of the reform is to improve 
the allocation and gradually enforcement of multifunctional aspects. Modulation will somewhat lessen 
the support of large farms. However the approved system foresees more restricted income reallocation 
than originally proposed. (Modulation will affect only 1.16 billion euro instead of the originally 
proposed 3.5 billion euro.) Reallocation of these resources can theoretically favour the less developed 
countries. Modulation however, will not reverse the fact that the larger part of support will be 
allocated to large farms of which efficiency and profitability is more favourable than that of the 
smaller ones. Reallocation effect of models chosen for national implementation of the single farm 
payment can be significant. Regionalisation could result in strong evening: it would put massive 
burden on farms which are more intensive and at the same time, would favour the more extensive 
ones. (Effects of hybrid models, which are more or less based on regions, could be similar.) 
Structural change, more efficient resource allocation. The on-going reforms could somewhat 
reduce the ratio of animal breeding in the production structure. The most unprofitable part of it will be 
forced to leave the market. (This process will be accelerated by decupling of support.) Sugar market 
reform could result in a decreasing sugar production. Production of plants could decline on marginal 
areas and extensification becomes more important. As regards the farm structure, significance of 
competitive aspects will increase. Structural change can accelerate. Activity of non-competitive units 
drives back: reduction of expenditure results in a more extensive structure, the rural activity possibly 
focuses exclusively on the maintenance of landscape. Competitive units can acquire physical resources 
of actors losing their market. Depending on the level of decoupling a more efficient system of resource 
allocation could be the result.  
Decreasing cost of land and/or declining land prices? Decoupled nature of the single farm 
payment may affect costs and prices of land. The increasing sum of area based support can 
theoretically boost land prices. However, because of the system of cross compliance, beneficiaries are 
bound to provide certain (environmental etc.) services. Expenditure of these additional services and 
  8other conditions of the support can also influence the costs of land. These effects are different in the 
various models of decoupling. The model based on historical entitlements may strengthen the position 
of tenants, as the value of entitlements is based on individual performance (area cultivated, number of 
animals etc.) of former periods. However, if the ratio of areas without entitlements is small, 
possibilities of tenants are limited. If the support is allocated exclusively based on areas, all the arable 
and grass land is entitled for the support which is determined as a regional average. The support will 
than capitalise in land prices rental fees. (Depending on the elements chosen, hybrid models are 
between the two basic models.) At the same time, there will be market for support entitlements.  
Limited rural development possibilities. Effects accelerating structural change and the adjustment 
pressure would require expanding investment, training and market development programs. At the 
same time more activity would be required in agri-enviornment and rural development. However, the 
reform does not result in a significant rise of rural development funds.  
Decreasing level of support? Due to the tight budgetary frames a support decreasing mechanism 
may start to operate from 2007. Besides the modulation this mechanism can also reduce the sum of the 
single farm payment. The tight budgetary frames may prevent rural development to evolve. At the 
same time they can also strengthen the trends pushing for re-nationalization.  
 
 
5 Concluding remarks 
 
The most radical feature of the June 2003 CAP reform agreement is the decoupling of subsidies 
from production and their replacement by one farm payment, known as the single farm payment. It 
was expected that single farm payment brings a significant simplification of the support system. 
However, different de-coupling models, and the possibility of partial de-coupling have resulted in a 
very complex system with a wide range of national diversities. Severe problems may arise during the 
implementation and control of the system.  
Economic impact of the various decoupling models depends mainly on the level the decoupled 
payment effects production decisions. The 2003 CAP reform constitutes a major change in the way 
direct payments are made in the EU. The introduction of the SFP results in a reduction in the link 
between the payments and production. Also the findings of the OECD’s works (2003, 2004, 2005) 
show that single farm payment has no or at most minimal trade and production distorting effects. 
A change in a support model is inevitably accompanied by redistribution effects: there will be 
winners and losers of the new system. In case of the historical model beef breeders may realize an 
unexpected benefit, while veal keepers will suffer a loss. Transfer of resources comes about inside the 
sector. In the regional system however, transfer of resources between sectors is also possible. This 
system favours the more extensive farms.  
A fully decoupled support does not influence the producers’ production decisions. Structure of 
production depends exclusively on the relative profitability of different products. In these 
circumstances restructuring may accelerate and resource allocation could become more effective. 
However, partial decoupling continues to prevent production adjusting to market signals and it raises 
production above the optimal level distorting agricultural markets and at the same time, slows 
structural change down. 
Single farm payment is based on agricultural area. As its amount is significantly higher than that 
of the former area based payments, it can theoretically raise the price and rental cost of land. The 
traditional model may strengthen the position of tenants. In this case the rise in land prices is limited, 
what is more land prices may even reduce. In the regionalized system however, the amount of the 
support will capitalize mainly in land prices and rent fees.  
Despite of the above mentioned deficiencies and difficulties 2003 CAP reform may bring 
significant changes to the operational environment of the CAP: market coordination becomes more 
important and the competitive pressure increases; reduction of overproduction and increasing 
competitiveness can be expected; there will be important redistribution effects; structural change, more 
  9efficient resource allocation; possibly decreasing cost of land and/or declining land prices; possibly 
decreasing level of support.   
In sum, we can say that the 2003 CAP reform and the new support provide an opportunity to 
overcome some of the difficulties the CAP faces with. However, the wide range of national diversities 
(as a consequence of the newly introduced measures) threatens the principle of the single market, and 
transparency and operation of the common market organizations. As there is a wide range of possible 
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